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Healthcare demonstrates the same properties of risk, complexity, uncertainty, dynamic change, and time–pressure as other high
hazard sectors including aviation, nuclear power generation, the military, and transportation. Unlike those sectors, healthcare has
particular traits that make it unique such as wide variability, ad hoc conﬁguration, evanescence, resource constraints, and govern-
mental and professional regulation. While healthcares blunt (management) end is more easily understood, the sharp (operator) end
is more diﬃcult to research the closer one gets to the sharp ends point. Understanding sharp end practice and cognitive work can
improve computer-based systems resilience, which is the ability to perform despite change and challenges. Research into actual prac-
tice at the sharp end of healthcare will provide the basis to understand how IT can support clinical practice. That understanding can
be used to develop computer-based systems that will act as team players, able to support both individual and distributed cognitive
work at healthcares sharp end.
 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Much of the government-sponsored work on patient
safety has been directed to support the production of
new information technology (IT). There is little evi-
dence, though, that the use of IT to improve safety
has any sustained positive eﬀect. There are also good
theoretical reasons to suppose that the return on health-
care IT investment may be only marginally positive. Hu-
man-centered computing in healthcare is elusive. This is
due in great part to an inadequate understanding of
what humans actually do in healthcare. Understanding
actual practice through research as well as coordinating
new IT equipment and systems to be team players will
enable healthcare IT to better withstand change and1532-0464/$ - see front matter  2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jbi.2004.11.002
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(R. Cook).challenge, or be resilient. This paper provides a brief dis-
cussion of IT in the healthcare setting. It then provides
two examples of current IT support for healthcare. It
concludes by describing the kind of research that is nec-
essary to create resilient IT for future application at the
sharp end (operator) of healthcare.2. Characteristics of acute care
Like its high hazard sector counterparts such as avi-
ation, nuclear power generation, ground transportation,
and the military, healthcare is typically risky, complex,
uncertain, undergoing continual change, and time-pres-
sured. Staﬀ resources are constrained in a number of
ways including availability, qualiﬁcations, shift and
rank. Decisions can, and do, have severe consequences.
Healthcare has additional characteristics that make it
unique. Guidelines for clinical practice are not consis-
tent and actually conﬂict with each other in some in-
stances. Demands for care are uncertain, vary widely,
C. Nemeth et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 38 (2005) 18–25 19and are in a continual state of change. Work is per-
formed on compromised systems (patients) whose aﬄic-
tion and response to treatment are not clear and vary
widely. To meet these care demand traits, equipment
and supplies are assembled ad hoc—improvised to ﬁt
the need at hand.
Healthcare organizations include tightly constrained
teams of service providers who perform complex proce-
dures that routinely have signiﬁcant consequences. Sys-
tem performance can be compared to a wedge that has
both sharp and blunt ends. Practitioners generate work
at the sharp end of the system by applying expertise and
actions to generate results. The blunt end employs poli-
cies, procedures, resources and constraints that support
and shape work at the sharp end [1]. While blunt (man-
agement) end cognitive work is more evident, sharp
(operator) end cognition is more diﬃcult to fathom
the closer one gets to the sharp ends point. This is be-
cause sharp end knowledge is dense, complex, changes
rapidly, and is embedded in a complex social setting that
resists scrutiny by those who are considered to be ‘‘out-
siders.’’ Care settings, patient populations and con-
straints vary widely, and institutional thresholds are
high to protect privacy.
Medical care for patients requires substantial cogni-
tive work. Cognitive work is also performed to accom-
plish what has been termed technical work [1].
Technical work entails the many practical, yet essential,
activities that are needed to perform medical care. Each
care procedure depends on the timely synchronization of
people, equipment, tools, and facilities to perform it.Fig. 1. Technical work and medical caThe planning and management of procedures for an en-
tire suite of operating rooms also requires coordination.
Both the individual procedure level and the collective
unit level require the performance of cognitive tasks that
include resource availability assessment, allocation,
anticipation, prediction, trade-oﬀ decisions, speculation,
and negotiation. The control and display interfaces for
each piece of diagnostic and therapeutic equipment are
an example of IT to assist medical care. Software to as-
sist resource allocation planning and management is an
example of IT to support cognitive technical work.
Technical work is intimately related to clinical care
and it exerts real inﬂuences on decisions that are made.
Fig. 1 illustrates the interaction between the domain of
medical care and the domain of technical work, using
the example of whether a patient will receive a simple
diagnostic test. Whether a patient undergoes a particu-
lar test depends on a number of considerations beyond
its clinical features. Those considerations include
whether staﬀ, equipment and facility resources are avail-
able, how long the queue is to receive the test, and
whether other suitable tests may be available. Each of
the interactions matters, because each has clinical conse-
quences. The needs of clinical care shape technical work,
just as technical work shapes clinical care. The regular
use of clinical resources inﬂuences the expectations for
resource use and allocation. Practitioners and those
who coordinate their work tend to act in anticipation
of future possibilities. How they view the prospects for
available resources tends to inﬂuence how they act in
the present.re are contingent on each other.
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20 C. Nemeth et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 38 (2005) 18–25Clinicians are the most adaptive elements of the sys-
tem at the sharp end and act to make up for any gaps
that may occur in the continuity of care [2]. IT systems
that are developed to support such work need to enable
practitioners to succeed in coping with the complexity of
their daily work [3].Fig. 3. Complexity versus research eﬀort at the blunt and sharp ends
of healthcare.
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Healthcare information technology (IT) originated
with the need for hospitals to manage business-related
data such as billing through the use of centralized soft-
ware systems. The proliferation of personal computers
and equipment user interfaces expanded IT from a cen-
tralized business role to include operations throughout
the organization. The result has suﬀused healthcare with
computer-based systems from the blunt to the sharp end
of acute care organizations. Understanding the role of
IT in healthcare requires knowledge of the cognitive
work that the system is intended to support. Rasmus-
sens [4] description of the relationships among various
disciplines that are involved in risk management (Fig.
2) illustrates the relationship among all participants in
the healthcare sector. IT that is intended to serve man-
agement is necessarily developed to support the policy,
logistics, and planning that the blunt end of the organi-
zation exists to provide.Fig. 2. Hierarchy of decision-making levels in risk management
(Rasmussen, 1998).Equipment and systems that are intended for use by
clinicians must necessarily reﬂect actual clinical practice
to be well-suited for use at the sharp end. The eﬀorts
that are required to accomplish this are not simple, as
this is the most complex and varied work setting that
IT has tried to support [5]. Support for sharp end cogni-
tive work requires attention to the subtleties and com-
plexities of the real world that are unforgiving in their
consequences.
As a hierarchy, Fig. 2 does not reﬂect the qualitative
diﬀerences moving from the sharp end up the diagram
towards the blunt end. Fig. 3 suggests the trade-oﬀ be-
tween research eﬀort and complexity that occurs while
moving from the blunt to the sharp end of the healthcare
environment. It is possible that the eﬀort that is required
to understand sharp end practice becomes prohibitive at
some point. Beyond this threshold, the time and re-
sources that are necessary to eﬀectively support practi-
tioners may be diﬃcult to justify. Further discussion
could probe whether such circumstances exist and what
IT support under such conditions should be like.
In contrast with other sectors such as the military and
aviation, little attention has been paid to the systemic as-
pects of healthcare. The research that is necessary to ob-
tain that understanding is performed infrequently. This
is because research into healthcare cognition is diﬃcult,
for a number of reasons. Information is dense at the
sharp end. Practitioners devote more attention to their
own science rather than on support issues. Clinical prac-
tice changes often and there are many points of view as
to how it should be performed. Views on what consti-
tutes the preferred approach are subjects of debate. As
a result, sharp end research takes signiﬁcant sustained
eﬀort. The desire to create systems that are human-cen-
tered [6] is worthwhile, yet is far more diﬃcult than
many appreciate. This is what David Woods meant by
noting that ‘‘the road to technology centered systems
C. Nemeth et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 38 (2005) 18–25 21is paved with user-centered intentions’’ [7]. Research
that is performed with the intention to be user-centered,
but does not actually succeed, leaves us with results that
are molded solely by technology considerations.
The authors of this paper have conducted extensive
study into healthcare cognition and IT needs. Two
examples illustrate the actual performance of information
technology in healthcare. The ﬁrst example describes
practitioner programming of a commercially available
infusion device that is in daily use in a major urban teach-
ing hospital. It occurs at theWork level in Fig. 2. The sec-
ond example, which occurs at the Staﬀ level in Fig. 2,
describes recently implemented assignment scheduling
software for a 100-member anesthesia department at the
same site. It occurs at the Staﬀ level in Fig. 2.4. Infusion device interfaces
Potent, short acting intravenous medications now
form an important part of critical care. The pharmacol-
ogy of these agents and diﬀerent practice patterns have
driven the need for multiple, carefully controlled infu-
sion schemes. Electronic infusion pumps have been
developed to manage the administration of these medi-
cation schemes. However, programming these devices
has presented unforeseen complications that present sig-
niﬁcant implications for medical safety.
The advent of small, inexpensive microprocessors has
led to the development of infusion devices that can per-Fig. 4. Infusion device as a manualform consistently and accurately. Most infusions in US
hospitals are now provided by such devices [8]. In eﬀect,
this adds another member to the acute care team that
needs to cooperate with clinicians. Unfortunately, the
devices do not always cooperate well. Practitioners have
to perform additional work to coordinate and program
the devices. The additional cognitive work that is in-
volved with programming these devices presents unfore-
seen complications that can have signiﬁcant implications
for patient safety.
Fig. 4 compares manual and semi-automated ap-
proaches to infusion. In the manual arrangement, a cli-
nician observes ﬂuid drip directly from a bag suspended
over a patient and controls its rate using a mechanical
resistor. In the semi-automated arrangement, the clini-
cian observes an infusion pump display that reports on
microprocessor status and presses controls to change
the microprocessor state. The microprocessor controls
and monitors the pump mechanism, which in turn
pumps ﬂuid to the patient.
Previous research in our laboratory [9] has demon-
strated that the current generation of infusion devices
incorporates multiple modes of operation, involves sub-
stantial operator programming, and contains layered,
nested menus with complex branching. We have found
that interface designs provide little useful feedback
about the state of program entry, the history of opera-
tion, or the past or present states of infusion devices.
The complexity of the menu structure, the menuspace
of these devices, appear to defy any attempts at mastery.and semi-automated system.
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22 C. Nemeth et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 38 (2005) 18–25Even the most skilled users appeared to have a working
knowledge of a small portion of the pathways. These
traits cause experienced device operators to frequently
become lost while programming, have diﬃculty tracking
device states, and misinterpret device function. Device
displays that show current pump state and the paths
that are available to reach goal states are often ambigu-
ous. This has made becoming ‘‘lost’’ very likely and
forces the practitioner to develop coping strategies that
are eﬀective, yet are vulnerable to failure in actual use.
This suggests that there are deep diﬃculties with the
interface. These characteristics of infusion devices are
not the traits of ‘‘team players,’’ which need to be both
observable and directable by clinicians [10].5. Unit assignment scheduling programs
To support the cognitive load of technical work,
acute care practitioners including operating room
(OR) staﬀ have developed physical cognitive artifacts
[11] including status boards, schedules and checklists
to capture, use and convey information. These artifacts
support a distributed cognition, which is a ‘‘commonly
shared knowledge that beneﬁts a group but cannot be
known by any single individual’’ [12]. Fig. 5 describesFig. 5. Artifact distributes cognition acroindividual and social senses of distributed cognition as
well as the multiple roles cognitive artifacts play. Mak-
ing automation a team player is a challenge, even in a
relatively well-controlled healthcare environment. A
brief example shows the kinds of problems that can oc-
cur when an anesthesia assignment master schedule is
converted from a physical to an electronic display. A
physical version of a master schedule had made it possi-
ble for the coordinator in an acute care anesthesia
department to control the accuracy of information that
was used to make daily staﬀ assignment decisions. Only
the coordinator would make marks on the one original
hard copy that was posted at the coordinator station.
The physical artifact also made it possible for the coor-
dinator to make margin notes. This allowed for keeping
track of unoﬃcial, yet important information such as
the name and extension of a staﬀ member who had
called with information related to a case. The conversion
of the master schedule from a physical to a digital arti-
fact has had a number of consequences. Now, many ele-
ments of information have been truncated. Details can
only be found by drilling down through multiple levels
of the interface. Much of the ﬁne grained detail regard-
ing changes, such as when they were made and who
made them, is no longer available. The OR nurse is
now responsible for reporting patient arrival in thess time and among team members.
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when all attention is focused on preparing the patient
and OR for the upcoming procedure. The lag in report-
ing case status that results causes the coordinator to sec-
ond guess the display, to do additional cognitive work to
check on case status, and erodes conﬁdence in the coor-
dinator as the pivotal decision maker. As the status of
cases changes through the day on the electronic display,
the location on the screens also changes. This requires
team members to search across multiple display screens
to ﬁnd them [13].
These and other healthcare IT diﬃculties can be bet-
ter managed by understanding the strengths and limits
of IT, as well as how practitioners actually perform their
work.6. Discussion
A number of inﬂuences have brought about the cur-
rent state of aﬀairs in healthcare IT.
Management—pharmaceutical ﬁrms write contracts
for intravenous medications with purchasing agents.
Infusion devices that are used to administer the medica-
tions are often an afterthought. Clinicians actually have
little inﬂuence in the decision regarding which device
will be selected and used.
Manufacturer—ﬁrms that develop equipment tend to
be market-driven and have focused on features on the
front of customers minds such as dosing limit software.
Evaluating products in terms of their usability has not
been a priority.
Economic—resources are constrained, making it
more likely that a product used in one department such
as billing will be adapted for use in another department
such as the operating room suites.
Operational—the density of information at the sharp
end of practice makes it diﬃcult to understand without
concerted research.
Overcoming the eﬀect of such signiﬁcant inﬂuences
requires a longer view to realize IT that could be consid-
ered human-centered. What vision leads us toward a
better understanding of human-centered healthcare IT?
Kephart and Chess [14] describe the concept of self-
managing, or autonomic, computing systems as a solu-
tion to the challenge that computing system size and
complexity pose. Their view aspires to be a far-reaching
IT manifesto and it would be reasonable to expect it
would include insightful notions about the ways that hu-
man and computer interact. Much of the autonomic vi-
sion deals with systems connectivity and operation. Its
discussion of goal speciﬁcation lends itself to the topic
that this paper addresses. Goal speciﬁcation poses two
crucial questions. How will humans be able to simply
and clearly express goals to computers? How will sys-
tems respond to human input that does not match whatthe system expects? Interestingly, Kepharts and Chess
position assumes the computing system will be correct
and will rely on its own notion of what human behavior
is acceptable. This assumption that a computing system
will tell a clinician what is correct does not fulﬁll our hu-
man-centered goal.
Christoﬀersen and Woods [10] oﬀer a diﬀerent and
more productive direction that implies circumstances
such as the two earlier examples in this paper are the re-
sult of a breakdown in the coordination between people
and technology. In their view, the issue is not more or
less automation, but rather understanding that will
make it possible to develop better coordinated human
and IT system teams. Crafting IT systems that are team
players requires ﬂuent interaction between human and
machine elements. This requires attention to coordina-
tion of activity that is observable and directable among
all participants, whether human or machine. Observabil-
ity involves shared representation of the problem states
nature, diﬃculty, and priority, as well as the nature, sta-
tus, rationale, duration of other agents activities. Direc-
tability has to do with who among participating agents
really owns how problems are being solved. Both of
the following examples provide a way to understand
how the principles of observability and directability
might be applied.
6.1. Infusion device interface
Infusion device interfaces currently oﬀer what
amounts to a ‘‘keyhole’’ view to one kind of informa-
tion: the current system state. Devices can be made ob-
servable by providing clinicians with information on
not only what is happening, but also what has hap-
pened, and what will happen based on current settings.
A directable infusion device will make it possible for a
clinician to take control of the infusion if necessary
and transfer control the pump when it is not. Clegg
et al. [15] have already described dynamic function
allocation that makes it possible to change responsibil-
ity for functions that can, and should, change with
conditions. The current trend in infusion devices ap-
pears to be headed away from being observable and
directable. Eﬀorts are now underway to convert infu-
sions to computerized physician order entry (CPOE).
Under this arrangement, a centralized computer system
will track and manage the provision of intravenous
medication. Such systems may be beneﬁcial, yet can
also suﬀer from diﬃculties such as being unable to
handle marginal conditions that are a regular part of
patient care.
6.2. Scheduling program
Nemeth and Cook [16] described how both anesthesia
coordinators and acute care team members in an OR
24 C. Nemeth et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 38 (2005) 18–25suite look at the current state of procedures, what has
happened, and what they anticipate will happen in order
to manage resources. This occurs constantly through the
day. Displays currently portray procedures according to
operating rooms and procedures that are assigned to
each room, by time of day. IT for assignment scheduling
can be made observable by designing it to support prac-
titioner cognitive work through time. Temporal displays
that show all ORs and their assigned cases in parallel
would complement how teams think about care demand
and eﬃcient resource assignments. A directable schedul-
ing program would make it possible for clinicians to
change format and features to best match the kind of
cognitive work that they perform. This feature is what
Nemeth [13] referred to as being ‘‘malleable.’’
Current IT systems in healthcare are like machines
that serve a function but do not reﬂect the personal
traits of its operator. Neither the infusion device nor
the electronic display examples reﬂects the cognitive
work that is performed by clinicians. Observable and
directable IT systems lead us toward programs that
can have the familiar and appropriate feel of well-worn
personal tools [17]. Research into practitioner cognitive
work is the means to pursue that direction.7. Research to understand practitioner cognitive work
Rasmussen [18] contends that understanding safety-
related issues in complex high hazard systems such as
healthcare must incorporate approaches from many dif-
ferent ﬁelds. This multi-disciplinary approach is neces-
sary because individual and group human behavior is
so complex that no single ﬁeld has captured it. Multiple
levels of decision making require diﬀerent research disci-
plines to understand them: law and sociology at the reg-
ulatory level, organizational sociology at the company
level, industrial organization at the management level,
and psychology, human factors and human–computer
interaction at the staﬀ level. The study of hazards and
eﬀorts to remedy them, termed risk management, spans
these levels. Because ‘‘diﬀerent hazard sources require
diﬀerent control strategies, it becomes clear that we have
to study the vertical interaction among the decision mak-
ers’’ (emphasis in original). Fig. 2 shows each discipline
according to its area of interest.
Understanding practitioner cognitive work relies on
the kind of research activity that is not normally found
within the ﬁeld of healthcare. Cognitive engineering
methods [19] such as cognitive task analysis can be used
in conjunction with observation to map the distributed
cognition processes that are related to daily work activ-
ity. The naturalistic decision making (NDM) approach
[20] has evolved among social scientists and engineers
within the past 20 years as the preferred means to hu-
man cognitive research. NDM uses stories and mentalsimulation to capture competing high-level goals in the
real world that are underspeciﬁed, unstated, varied in
their presence, poorly delineated and interactive.
NDM employs ethnomethodological techniques to bet-
ter understand how humans in groups dynamically en-
gage the world. Methods that are included within the
NDM approach include direct observation, workplace
studies (including interaction analysis and conversation
analysis), cognitive artifact analysis, schemata analysis,
workplace studies, and mental model analysis. Health-
care research professionals who perform this type of
work describe the use of methods that include observa-
tion, artifact analysis, workplace studies, schemata anal-
ysis and mental model analysis to understand
practitioner cognition at the sharp end [21].
7.1. Observation
Observational methods can be used to study the ways
that people perform and coordinate work [22]. Under-
standing ‘‘emerges from the researchers own observa-
tions and interviews out in the real world rather than
in the laboratory or the academy’’ [23].
7.2. Artifact analysis
Cognitive artifacts [10] such as checklists, felt marker
status boards, and schedules can be used to learn about
the work that they have been designed to support.
7.3. Workplace studies
Workplace studies, which largely consists of natural-
istic studies, or ethnographies, are ‘‘concerned with the
ways in which tools and technologies feature in work
interaction in organizational environments.’’ [24] Fro-
lich [25] and Drew and Heritage [26] extended workplace
study through the use of tools such as interaction anal-
ysis and conversational analysis. Interaction analysis is
‘‘an emerging method of analysing video recordings of
naturally occurring talk and activity.’’ In conversation
analysis, the researcher records and partially transcribes
stretches of naturally occurring talk and activity, then
‘‘examines how various sequences unfold, turn by turn,
during the episode.’’
7.4. Schemata analysis
Schemata are ‘‘abstract cognition structures that
guide the construction of mental models’’ in recogni-
tion-primed decision making [27]. Schemata analysis
can be used to discover the way that practitioners think
about the development of the master schedule each day.
Such analyses can include transcripts of the way practi-
tioners describe their though processes (verbal proto-
cols), artifact analysis, and (cognitive analyses).
C. Nemeth et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 38 (2005) 18–25 257.5. Mental model analysis
Hollnagel [28] explains that the mental model ‘‘repre-
sents the essential characteristics of a system, i.e., the
structural or functional details that are needed to ana-
lyse, design, modify or evaluate the system.’’ A model
that is accurate would respond to inputs in ways that
approximate the actual system.8. Conclusions
Information technology can either help or hinder
cognitive work. Conﬁdence over the potential for infor-
mation technology must be balanced by caution over its
potential diﬃculties. Systems that support healthcare
service provision must reﬂect a well-considered coordi-
nation between human and machine. That coordination
relies on understanding the actual nature of care, based
on original research. Current research that is now
underway in healthcare settings shows how practitio-
ners cognitive work at the sharp end can be understood
through original research. The development of comput-
ing in healthcare that is in fact human-centered relies on
the insights that ﬂow from such initiatives.Acknowledgments
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